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Abstract. This paper develops a research model explaining how task location 
and incentives affect the take up and, for those tasks that are processed, the time 
to start. For an empirical analysis, we use the system-generated data of all 1860 
location-based crowdsourcing tasks in Berlin available on the Streetspotr plat-
form within one year. 
The results indicate that while the population density of the task location 
does not influence the probability that some crowdworker will eventually pro-
cess the task, a task located in a more densely-populated area tends to be taken 
up more quickly. Moreover, the take-up probability is expected to increase as 
the monetary and non-monetary incentives are raised. However, both increasing 
the monetary incentives and lowering the non-monetary incentives tends to 
shorten the time to start. This suggests that high non-monetary incentives with 
which unattractive tasks are endowed do not entice the crowdworkers to quickly 
set about processing these tasks. 
Keywords: Location-based Crowdsourcing, Participation, Task Location, In-
centives. 
1 Introduction 
The participatory generation of content (user-generated content) and the collective 
knowledge of a large number of users form the foundational pillars of Web 2.0. Com-
panies apply the idea of the wisdom of the crowds [1] and collective intelligence to 
areas such as decision support, open innovation, social collaboration, and the so-
called crowdsourcing [2]. The term “crowdsourcing”, coined by Howe [3], refers to 
the outsourcing of traditional company tasks to the crowd, an indefinitely large and 
heterogeneous group of individuals. The crowd offers companies fast, flexible and 
relatively cost-efficient access to a large knowledge pool. The process is initiated with 
an open call on the Internet. Companies hope to obtain more efficient and better-
quality results from the crowd, composed of experts and laypersons, than from an 
internally-developed solution [4, 5]. 
In conjunction with smartphones, crowdsourcing offers a new set of possibilities 
for the performance of crowdsourcing tasks. Due to their Internet functionality and 
the integration of various sensors like motion sensors and GPS receivers, smartphones 
allow the users to generate and share content on the go, thus enabling simple and fast 
information exchange [6, 7]. With respect to the location of data collection, two types 
of mobile crowdsourcing can be distinguished: In location-independent (mobile) 
crowdsourcing, task solving is not linked to a specific location. An example for this 
kind of crowdsourcing is the mobile application of Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, 
which enables crowdworkers to work on tasks location-independently using their 
mobile phones [8, 9]. In contrast, location-based crowdsourcing requires the presence 
of a crowdworker at a specific location, because a certain activity (e. g., the collection 
of location-dependent information) can only be conducted on-site [10]. In both cases, 
the results can be submitted either via a mobile device or via a desktop PC [11].   
Although crowdsourcing is gaining widespread popularity, location-based 
crowdsourcing has only received little attention in the literature. However, there is a 
need for better insights into this specific form of crowdsourcing: Companies involved 
in location-based crowdsourcing projects are faced with new challenges due to the 
geographical constraints of the tasks or the limited screen size of mobile phones. If 
companies understand the effects of different task design parameters on the perfor-
mance of the mobile workforce, location-based crowdsourcing holds a considerable 
potential, due to its aforementioned opportunities. Baily and Fessler [12] argued that 
if a task is simple and relatively unattractive for the crowd, higher monetary incen-
tives are likely to lead to higher take-up rates, and improve the overall performance. 
Regarding the concept of location, researchers have often defined location as the dis-
tance between the location of a specific crowdworker and the location of the task, and 
have found that crowdworkers prefer to receive location-based tasks in close proximi-
ty to their home or their reporting location [11, 13]. These researchers thus considered 
“location” as a concept combining individual and task attributes. In our research pa-
per, we refer to the “task location” as a characteristic related to the task alone, inde-
pendent of any crowdworker’s location. Attributes related to the task location are the 
geographic coordinates and the population density of the task location, for instance.  
Using this task location concept, we empirically investigate the effects of task loca-
tion, monetary incentives and non-monetary incentives on participation. To this end, 
we make use of system-generated data from the crowdsourcing platform Streetspotr. 
First, we analyze how the identified parameters influence the take-up probability. 
Second, we take a closer look at the time to start, which refers to the time elapsed 
between the moment a task is issued on the crowdsourcing platform and the moment 
any crowdworker starts processing it [14]. To the best of our knowledge, there is no 
prior research explicitly studying these relationships using actual performance data. 
Insights into these relationships can help researchers and practitioners to design tasks 
in a way ensuring that they are indeed accepted up by crowdworkers, and more quick-
ly at that. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. After elaborating on job design 
theories, we review those crowdsourcing studies investigating the influence of loca-
tion and incentives on participation. We then develop our research model and apply it 
to system-generated data from the crowdsourcing platform Streetspotr. Finally, we 
discuss our findings and the limitations of the study.  
2 Theoretical Background 
Our research model is rooted in job design theory, which states that organizational 
and individual needs can both be met effectively through the manipulation of certain 
job characteristics [15]. Torraco [16] conducted a comprehensive literature review on 
job design theories and their application to new work environments. To study job 
design on the individual task level, he considered using the job characteristics model 
[17]. This model systematically outlines the links between the characteristics of a job, 
the individual’s experience with these job characteristics, and the outcomes in terms 
of motivation, satisfaction and performance. Hackman and Oldham [17] identified 
five core job dimensions: skill variety, task identity, task significance, autonomy, and 
feedback. The job characteristics model is among the most-recognized and complete 
theories for explaining job design characteristics and their relationships to work per-
formance and motivation, and it has led to an impressive body of research on job 
design. However, Torraco [16] found that this model and the related research focus on 
traditional work environments, and that they thus fail to explain the effects of job 
design in new work environments, where different task design parameters are of in-
terest. He argued that activity theory – also belonging to the family of job design the-
ories – may instead turn out to be capable of explaining job design in future settings.   
Activity theory stems from the Soviet cultural-historical psychology of Vygotsky, 
Leont'ev, and Luria [18]. It facilitates the analysis of purposeful behavior by focusing 
on the structure of the activity itself. In Vygotsky’s model of mediated act [19] the 
subject of any activity is an individual who is engaged in the activity. Mediated by 
tools, the individual transforms the object of the activity and achieves a certain out-
come (see Fig. 1). In this context, an activity is a goal-directed interaction of a subject 
with an object through the use of tools. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Vygotsky’s model of mediated act 
Activity theory is considered to be a meta-theory or a framework, rather than a predic-
tive theory. The considerable flexibility of this theory resulted in a number of applica-
tions in different areas. Engeström [20] used it to study the redesign of work in a pe-
diatric health care facility, whereas Jonassen and Rohrer-Murphy [21] as well as Ka-
rasavvidis [22] proposed activity theory as a framework to design learning environ-
ments. Kuutti [18] and Nardi [23] suggested that it can serve as an alternative frame-
work for studying human-computer interaction and design. In his work “Activity 







described the potential of activity theory to combine human and technological aspects 
of information systems in a more holistic research approach. Until today, many re-
searchers in the field of information systems management and human-computer inter-
action have applied activity theory (e. g., [25–29]). Recently, Hautasaari [30] used 
activity theory in the context of crowdsourcing and analyzed information search and 
translation activities. The results of his activity analysis were used to define design 
implications for a Wikipedia translation support system. Asmolov [31] argued that 
crowdsourcing platforms can give rise to different types of new activity systems and 
that activity theory can assist in conceptualizing the relationships between subject and 
object, as well as in analyzing the relationships around crowdsourcing platforms. 
In our research project, we also draw on activity theory to investigate the perfor-
mance of a crowdworker who has taken up a task, for example in terms of the time he 
needs to complete the task. According to activity theory, this time to completion is 
influenced by aspects of the object (i. e., task design parameters like its severity), 
characteristics of the subject (e. g., the crowdworker’s age and education), as well as 
properties of the tools used to fulfill the task (e. g., the quality of the camera built into 
the crowdworker’s smartphone). However, in this paper we will study that period in 
the task life cycle before any individual has begun to work on it. The outcomes of this 
period in terms of the take up (i. e., the fact whether or not a task is processed by any 
crowdworker) and, for those tasks that are taken up, the time to start (i. e., the time 
elapsed from issuing the task until it is taken up by some crowdworker) are therefore 
related to the design parameters of the task itself, which refer to the characteristics of 
the object. For the analysis of this period in the task life cycle, the outcomes are not 
directly related to the characteristics of any specific crowdworker or any specific tool. 
This is especially clear when it comes to explaining why a certain task has not been 
taken up; for such a task, an association with a specific crowdworker or a specific tool 
has never been established. Even for those tasks that have been processed, the time 
elapsed before the crowdworker finally took it up is not only related to the character-
istics of this one crowdworker and his or her smartphone. Rather, it is a consequence 
of the behavior of the whole set of crowdworkers who could potentially have taken up 
the task. Statistically speaking, the observed time to start is the first order statistic of 
the reaction times of all these individuals, who are representing a set of competing 
risks. 
3 Related Work 
A number of studies have already shed light on the relationships between different 
crowdsourcing parameters and participation. Many well-cited studies (e. g., [32–34]) 
focus on micro tasks outsourced to Amazon’s Mechanical Turk platform. However, 
only very few studies (e. g., [11, 13, 35]) have been conducted in the context of loca-
tion-based crowdsourcing. Therefore, this section reviews all kinds of crowdsourcing 
studies investigating the relationships between location, incentives and participation. 
In the next section, we will draw on the investigated variables and the findings of 
these studies when developing our research model and the related hypotheses. 
3.1 Location and Participation 
It seems obvious that in location-based crowdsourcing the location of a task should 
have a bearing on participation. However, there has been surprisingly little work ex-
amining the relationship between location and participation in location-based 
crowdsourcing. To study the effect of location on participation, Alt et al. [11] imple-
mented a crowdsourcing platform that integrated location as a parameter for allocat-
ing tasks to crowdworkers. Conducting two user studies, they found that participants 
prefer to solve tasks at home or in its vicinity and that participants prefer to search for 
tasks in their current location. These two user studies employed a small sample of 
nine participants, and they were of an experimental and qualitative nature. Following 
a similar qualitative research approach, Väätäjä et al. [13] studied location-based 
crowdsourcing for news reporting. To develop a new crowdsourcing process in hyper-
local news production, they recruited nine participants for their first study and 19 
participants for the subsequent quasi-experiment in field conditions. Their results 
indicate that the location affects the willingness to receive location-based crowdsourc-
ing assignments. In both research projects, the location-based tasks could be accessed 
and accomplished by a crowdworker only via smartphone and only if the participant 
was at the specific location. Thus the distance between the crowdworker and the 
crowdsourcing task played an important role in the respective context. 
In other flavors of location-based crowdsourcing, location is certainly influential 
but not crucial for participation. One main research stream in location-based crowd-
sourcing refers to participatory sensing, in which location-sensitive data is collected 
with mobile sensors [36]. In the project BrusSense, for instance, participants use their 
mobile phones to record noise levels at different locations throughout a city. The ag-
gregated homogeneous contributions result in a Noise Exposure Map to monitor the 
noise pollution in the city [37]. While the information is linked to a specific location, 
each participant can perform the task at any location within a given geographic area.  
Literature thus contains evidence for a relationship between location and participa-
tion in certain settings, whereby in most of the cases location is defined as the dis-
tance between the location of the crowdworker and the location of the task. The con-
cept “distance” is therefore inseparably linked with the individual crowdworker. As 
discussed above, our study focuses on that time period of the task life cycle in which 
the design parameters of the task play a pivotal role for the outcomes. Therefore, we 
will include task location in terms of population density of the location of the task in 
our research model. 
3.2 Incentives and Participation 
Mason and Watts [33] studied an image ordering task and a word puzzle task to inves-
tigate how compensation affects performance on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk plat-
form. They found that higher financial compensation increases the quantity of work 
performed by the participants, while it does not necessarily improve its quality. Using 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk to collect questionnaire data for research in psychology 
and in social sciences, Buhrmester et al. [34] showed that the participation rate is 
affected by the compensation rate and the length of the task. Bailey and Fessler [12] 
investigated moderating effects of task complexity and task attractiveness on the im-
pact of monetary incentives and found that higher compensation rates improve partic-
ipation if the task is simple. In full agreement with the previous findings, Rogstadius 
et al. [38] showed that rewards substantially increase both the take-up and the overall 
completion rates. Monetary incentives were also found to be the most important factor 
for participation in the software development crowdsourcing domain [39]. Zheng et 
al. [40] investigated the relationships between crowdsourcing contest characteristics, 
motivation, and participation. In contrast to other studies, their results did not support 
the hypothesis that monetary incentives positively influence participation; however, 
they found that the possibility of gaining recognition was positively associated with 
participation. Paolacci et al. [41] analyzed survey tasks on Amazon’s Mechanical 
Turk as an alternative to online surveys. They found that there are many non-
monetary reasons for participation, such as entertainment or simply “killing time”.   
A great number of studies addressing the relationship between incentives and par-
ticipation (e. g., [33, 34, 42]) indicate the relevance of this topic in research. The ma-
jority of the presented studies suggest that the amount of incentives influences partic-
ipation. We will therefore include both monetary and non-monetary incentives in our 
research model. 
4 Research Model 
The above discussion of the related work suggests that both the task location and the 
incentives may influence participation in location-based crowdsourcing. Apart from 
qualitative or experimental work, there has not been any comprehensive study that 
empirically investigates the relationships between task location, monetary and non-
monetary incentives as well as participation in a location-based crowdsourcing setting 
and using actual data from a crowdsourcing platform; specifically, the trade-off ef-
fects between task location and incentives have not yet been analyzed. If we under-
stand these relationships, we can provide companies with design guidelines for their 
crowdsourcing tasks, to improve the outcomes in the first period of the task life cycle. 
Tailored to the specific circumstances of location-based crowdsourcing, we propose 
the research model shown in Fig. 2, which is based on activity theory and Vygotsky’s 
model of mediated act [19]. It incorporates the previously-identified independent 
variables task location, monetary incentives and non-monetary incentives as well as 
the dependent variables take up and time to start.  
The corresponding hypotheses are as follows:  
H1:  Task location is associated with the take-up probability. 
H2:  Monetary incentives are positively associated with the take-up probability. 
H3:  Non-monetary incentives are positively associated with the take-up probability. 
H4:  Task location is associated with the time to start. 
H5:  Monetary incentives are positively associated with the time to start. 
H6:  Non-monetary incentives are positively associated with the time to start. 
 
Fig. 2. Research Model 
5 Research Method and Data Analysis 
5.1 Research Setting and Data Collection 
The data for this study comes from the crowdsourcing platform Streetspotr. The 
Streetspotr platform serves as a service intermediary and enables companies to out-
source small location-based tasks to private individuals. A company can configure 
tasks on the crowdsourcing platform, which are subsequently made available and 
which can then be processed with a mobile application. To create a task a company 
must decide on the task title, the task description, the task location, and the incentives. 
The company then needs to choose a suitable tool set configuration using one or sev-
eral of the tool set options text, rating, photo, video, single choice and multiple choice 
provided by the system. A typical task in the field of retail execution could be: “Take 
a picture of the ‘Death Star’ (Lego number 10143) and its presentation (decoration 
and display) in the Lego Store. Ensure that the product and its environment can easily 
be seen.” Registered crowdworkers are notified about the new assignment via an open 
call; they can review, accept and process the job from their smartphones. Once a task 
has been completed, the company is informed through the crowdsourcing platform 
and reviews the result. If the result is satisfactory, the crowdworker receives the dedi-
cated incentive in the form of Euros and/or virtual points (so-called Streetpoints). By 
collecting Streetpoints, the crowdworker gains recognition via public leaderboards 
within the crowdworker community. To date, Streetspotr counts over 200,000 regis-
tered users in Germany, 72% of which are male, while only 28% are female.  
We carried out our analyses employing all user-activity data from the Streetspotr 
platform generated in Berlin between April 1, 2012 and May 31, 2013. For each one 
of the 1860 unique location-based crowdsourcing tasks in this sample, we extracted 
the available information on task location, incentives, and participation from the 
Streetspotr database via SQL statements. Table 1 lists descriptive statistics for all 
variables extracted, including measures of location (mean, median), measures of vari-
ation (standard deviation), and the number of tasks in our sample for which the value 
of the respective variable was available.  
For our purposes, a crucial aspect of the task location seems to be if the task can 
easily and quickly be reached by the crowdworkers, or if it is located in some far-off 
region. We therefore operationalized task location by the population density of the 













Table 1.   Descriptive statistics for the variables extracted 




PopDensity 0.0397 1.6164 0.8849 1.0713 0.4061 1860 
IncEuro 0 15 1.0435 1 1.4844 1860 
IncPoints 0 120 31.6290 15 19.4147 1860 
TakeUp 0 1 0.9909 NA NA 1860 
TTS 0.0028 453.3925 107.2566 13.9386 134.0516 1843 
 
Berlin counts 96 districts with population densities ranging from 150 inhabitants per 
square kilometer in Blankenfelde to 16,261 inhabitants per square kilometer in 
Friedenau. From the Streetspotr database we extracted the geographic coordinates of 
each task and performed a reverse geocoding to convert the coordinates into addresses 
including the district. After the automated reverse geocoding process, we ran con-
sistency checks on the results. In some cases the district information was missing or 
the address did not match the respective district. After identifying all inconsistencies, 
we manually added missing and corrected false information. Finally, we mapped the 
district density (PopDensity), measured in 10,000 inhabitants/km², available from 
official sources [43] to the converted addresses. As can be seen from Table 1, the 
1860 tasks were located in districts with population densities between 397 and 16,164 
inhabitants per square kilometer. 
Monetary incentives are measured in Euro (IncEuro), and non-monetary incentives 
are operationalized by the Streetpoints (IncPoints) a crowdworker receives when he or 
she completes the task. It was possible to directly extract both measures from the 
database. While IncEuro ranged from zero to 15 Euros, less than 50 per cent of all 
tasks were endowed with monetary incentives exceeding one Euro, such that the mean 
of IncEuro is only slightly higher than one Euro. In contrast, the mean and the median 
of IncPoints are not that close to their minimum value, indicating less concentration at 
the lower end of the range of Streetpoints promised. 
Extracting the times of all status changes for a task documented in the database, we 
were able to derive a binary variable (TakeUp) indicating whether the task was at all 
taken up by any crowdworker (TakeUp = 1) or whether no crowdworker has ever 
started to process it (TakeUp = 0). While a task might be published again after being 
unsatisfactorily completed by a crowdworker, we did not take into account the 
crowdworkers’ reaction to such a repeated advertisement, which might differ from the 
reaction to a new task. Hence, TakeUp takes exactly one value for each of the 1860 
tasks in our sample. Although TakeUp is a qualitative variable, its mean has a useful 
interpretation; it represents the fraction of tasks taken up by a crowdworker: 99.09% 
(i. e., 1843) of the total 1860 tasks were ever started to be processed.  
For each task with TakeUp = 1, we also calculated the time to start (TTS) as the 
time interval (in days) between the moment when the task was originally made avail-
able and the moment when it was first taken up by a crowdworker. Overall, 664 
unique crowdworkers initially worked on any of the 1843 tasks that were taken up. 
Their gender distribution (23% female, 76% male, gender not provided by 1%) re-
flects the one of the Streetspotr population.  
5.2 Analysis 
All analyses described in this paper were carried out with the statistical software 
package R [44]. To examine whether there is an association between our three inde-
pendent variables and the fact that a task is (not) taken up by any crowdworker, as 
suggested by hypotheses H1 to H3, we employ a logit model of the form  
ln (
𝑃(TakeUp = 1)
1 − 𝑃(TakeUp = 1)
) =𝛽10 + 𝛽11 ∙ PopDensity + 𝛽12 ∙ IncEuro + 𝛽13 ∙ IncPoints + 𝜀1. (1) 
The variance inflation factors calculated for the independent variables based on the 
1860 observed tasks amount to 1.0013 (PopDensity), 1.0015 (IncEuro) and 1.0003 
(IncPoints), respectively. All these values are close to one. This means that for each 
independent variable the variance of the estimator of the related parameter is hardly 
higher than in the hypothetic case in which there is no linear dependence between all 
independent variables [45]. Multicollinearity is thus not an issue in our data set.  
Table 2 lists the parameter estimates obtained via iteratively reweighted least 
squares estimation, their standard errors, as well as the related p values and odds rati-
os. All quantities have been rounded to four decimal places; p values below 0.00005 
are therefore shown as 0.0000. According to these results, there is no significant asso-
ciation between the population density and the probability that the task will be taken 
up by a crowdworker, which contradicts our hypothesis H1. However, we do find 
support for hypotheses H2 and H3. At any reasonable significance level, the null hy-
pothesis that IncEuro (or IncPoints) does not influence the participation probability 
can be rejected, and the estimated associations are positive: The higher the monetary 
or non-monetary incentives, the higher the probability that some crowdworker will 
start working on the task. More precisely, each odds ratio shown represents the factor 
by which the take-up odds (i. e., the probability of the task being taken up divided by 
the probability of not being taken up) tend to change if the value of the respective 
explanatory variable is increased by one. For example, if one Euro more has been 
promised as an incentive for task A than for task B (everything else being the same), 
then task A is 40.80 more likely, than not, to be taken up as compared with task B. It 
can thus be seen that increasing the monetary incentives by one Euro has a much larg-
er effect than increasing the non-monetary incentives by one Streetpoint.  
 
Table 2. Regression results for the logit model in Equation (1) 
 
 Estimate Standard error p value Odds ratio, exp(Estimate) 
(Intercept) -1.1115 0.9274 0.0000 NA 
PopDensity -0.0433 0.7148 0.9520 0.9576 
IncEuro 3.7088 0.5654 0.0000 40.8042 
IncPoints 0.1266 0.0177 0.0000 1.1350 
LR: 62.9701 (df: 3, p value: 0.0000)  
 
Fig. 3. Take-up probability estimated for each task based on the logit model 
The overall fit of the logit model is evaluated in terms of the likelihood ratio (LR) 
statistic, which compares the likelihood value attained by this model with the one of 
the intercept-only model. Since the LR statistic asymptotically follows a chi-square 
distribution with three degrees of freedom (df), the value of 62.9701 attained implies 
a p value below 0.00005. We can therefore reject the null hypothesis that the inter-
cept-only model is as effective as our model at any reasonable significance level. 
Fig. 3 depicts the take-up probability estimated using the logit model for each of 
the 1860 tasks (ordered based on their system-internal task ID). While those 17 tasks 
in the data set that have never been taken up by a crowdworker are drawn as red tri-
angles, the 1843 tasks for which TakeUp = 1 are represented by black circles. Indeed, 
the estimated take-up probabilities seem to allow a good separation between the two 
types of tasks. For 14 of the 17 unclaimed tasks the estimated probability ranges be-
tween 0.67 and 0.69. Only four of the tasks processed by a crowdworker, namely 
tasks no. 1137, 1138, 1139, and 1141 in the data set, feature an estimated take-up 
probability below 0.9. In fact, these are the only tasks observed for which neither any 
monetary nor any non-monetary incentives had been promised. 
According to the hypotheses H4 to H6 the variables PopDensity, IncEuro and 
IncPoints should also be associated with TTS, the time until the task is taken up by a 
crowdworker. Using TTS as the dependent variable in a linear regression model is 
problematic, because TTS is restricted to non-negative values, while the model might 
produce fitted values below zero. We therefore propose the following regression 
model explaining the natural logarithm of TTS: 
lnTTS =𝛽20 + 𝛽21 ∙ PopDensity + 𝛽22 ∙ IncEuro + 𝛽23 ∙ IncPoints + 𝜀2. (2) 
This model can be estimated based on those 1843 tasks that have been processed. 
As shown before, for the full data set of all 1860 tasks there is no multicollinearity 
between the three independent variables, and this conclusion still holds after dropping 
the few tasks for which TakeUp = 0. 
 































In the classic linear regression model, it is assumed that the disturbances 2 follow 
a normal distribution. This assumption ensures that the t tests employed for judging 
the significance of associations are valid. We use the Shapiro-Wilk test [46] for de-
termining whether or not the residuals, i. e., the estimated disturbances, have been 
sampled from a normal distribution. The value of the test statistic obtained from our 
data (0.9168) implies a p value smaller than 0.00005; for any reasonable significance 
level, the hypothesis of normally-distributed disturbances thus needs to be rejected. 
While this means that the t test statistics do not exactly follow a t distribution, it can 
be shown that the t tests are asymptotically valid, and are thus approximately valid for 
large sample sizes, if the other assumptions of the classic linear model (known as the 
Gauss-Markov assumptions) hold [47].   
Our large number of observations would surely allow us to make use of asymptotic 
results. However, the assumption that the disturbances are homoscedastic, which is 
one of the Gauss-Markov assumptions, seems questionable. To check it, we carry out 
a Breusch-Pagan test [48], in the studentized version due to Koenker (1981). Indeed, 
the test results (BP test statistic = 206.736, p value < 0.00005) indicate that we need 
to reject the hypothesis that the homoscedasticity assumption holds. As a conse-
quence, the usual equation for calculating the standard errors of the parameter estima-
tors are not valid [47], and the t test statistics derived based on these standard errors 
are not (asymptotically) normal. 
White [50] proposed an approach for computing valid standard errors in the pres-
ence of heteroscedasticity, and we make use of these heteroscedasticity-consistent 
(HC) standard errors. They are shown in Table 3, listing our regression results for the 
linear model, in addition to the related p values and the parameter estimates. Obvious-
ly, at any reasonable significance level the hypothesis that the independent variable 
does not affect the logarithm of the TTS can be rejected for PopDensity, IncEuro, and 
IncPoints. The association between IncPoints and the logarithm of TTS is positive, 
which is counterintuitive. In Section 6, we will give a rationale for this finding. 
However, for the former two explanatory variables, there is a negative association, 
as expected: Tasks located in a district with a higher population density tend to be 
taken up more quickly by a crowdworker, as are tasks for which a higher monetary 
incentive has been promised. For example, if the population density of the location of 
task A exceeds the one of task B by of 5,000 inhabitants per square kilometer, then it 
can be expected that the time to start of task A will be 15.3% (exp(-0.3330∙0.5)-1) 
lower than the one of task B. By increasing the monetary incentives by 16 Cents a 
similar decrease in the time to start of 15.0% (exp(-1.0140∙0.16)-1) could be attained.  
 
Table 3. Regression results for the linear model in Equation (2) 
 
 Estimate HC standard error p value 
(Intercept) 1.3410 0.1479 0.0000 
PopDensity -0.3330 0.0913 0.0003 
IncEuro -1.0140 0.0435 0.0000 
IncPoints 0.0851 0.0023 0.0000 
R2: 0.6975 
The coefficient of determination (R
2
) obtained for the linear regression model indi-
cates that 69.75% of the total variation in the logarithm of TTS can be explained by 
the three independent variables, representing a very satisfactory model fit. 
6 Discussion 
Our results show support for different findings from prior literature. We can con-
firm that monetary and non-monetary incentives both positively influence participa-
tion [12, 34, 38, 39, 41], as far as take up is concerned. However, monetary incentives 
show a much larger effect on take up than the non-monetary Streetpoints. Although a 
crowdworker can gain recognition within the Streetspotr community by collecting 
Streetpoints, money is still a more powerful incentive. Even if we could not confirm 
the hypothesis that the task location affects the probability that some crowdworker 
will start working on the task, we found that it influences participation in terms of the 
time to start. In many use cases of location-based crowdsourcing the location of a task 
is a fixed parameter that cannot be changed by the company designing the task (e. g., 
for the task of taking a photo of a specific building). However, we found that the ex-
pected effects of large differences in population density correspond to the ones of 
rather small changes in the monetary incentives. Thus, monetary incentives can com-
pensate for “unattractive locations”. In contrast to Zheng et al. [40] our results indi-
cate that non-monetary incentives increase the time to start. Why should crowdwork-
ers tend to be more hesitant to start working on tasks for which they will receive more 
Streetpoints? The reason for this finding seems to be rooted in the fact that tasks per-
ceived to be unattractive by the company (either due to their location, or because the 
company is not willing to promise a substantial Euro amount) tend to be endowed 
with higher non-monetary incentives. While we have seen before that increasing the 
number of Streetpoints increases the probability of taking up the task, it does not en-
tice the crowdworkers to do so more quickly. Even in the presence of a high non-
monetary incentive, an unattractive task tends to be taken up and processed by a 
crowdworker when it is convenient for him or her (for example, because (s)he hap-
pens to pass by in its vicinity); by themselves, the Streetpoints do not seem to allure a 
crowdworker to process the task at his or her earliest convenience. 
These findings could be used to implement an automated task recommendation 
system for companies in the backend of the crowdsourcing platform. For example, 
such a system could recommend how to set the monetary incentives if a company 
wants to make sure that the task can be expected to be taken up within a certain period 
of time. Moreover, our results hint on how to improve the general design of location-
based crowdsourcing platforms: As monetary and non-monetary incentives have been 
found to significantly influence the take-up behavior of the crowdworkers, it may be a 
good idea to prominently present this information for each task within the mobile 
application. Of course, it should be noted that exploiting the detected relationships in 
these ways might change the effects in the future. For instance, if a redesign of the 
graphical user interface should give more visibility to the Euro amount promised for 
finishing a task, this might make more crowdworkers focus on the monetary incen-
tives when selecting a task to process, leading to an even stronger positive association 
between this variable and the take-up probability. 
The findings of this study need to be weighed against its potential limitations. Our 
operationalization of task location by the population density of the district in which 
the task is located might pose a threat to construct validity. One could argue that the 
number of crowdworkers present within a certain radius from the task might be a 
better metric. However, movement profiles of the crowdworkers are not available, 
and the registered home address of a crowdworker does not necessarily represent the 
location where (s)he spends most of his or her time. Also, using such information may 
be problematic for reasons of data privacy. We therefore think that the chosen opera-
tionalization is the best currently available. Furthermore, as we have constructed our 
research model from previous literature, and have used appropriate statistical tech-
niques taking into account properties like non-normal and heteroscedastic disturb-
ances, we assume that the internal validity of our conclusions is not at risk. As for 
external validity, the data analyzed in this paper represents the location-based 
crowdsourcing tasks in Berlin in about one year’s time. While for example the popu-
lation density varies widely even within this one city, we cannot be sure that the re-
sults of this study also apply to rural areas. Moreover, it is possible that the behavior 
of the crowdworkers and their reaction to incentives will change in the future. 
In future studies, we will investigate additional task design parameters as well as 
the amount of time spent on completing a task. Both a fast acceptance and a rapid 
processing time ensure that companies get their crowdsourcing results quickly. 
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